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The term “hermeneutics” appears only three times in Nietzsche’s notebooks and never in his 
published works.  Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s texts are fertile sources of  ideas, concepts, and 
arguments that intersect with the hermeneutical tradition.  This essay will chart several key points of  
contact between Nietzsche and the hermeneutical tradition. 
 
Taken broadly, hermeneutics is the interpretation of  meaningful entities.  This raises two sets of  
questions.  First, what is the range of  hermeneutics?  That is, what are the appropriate objects toward 
which an interpretive stance should be directed?  Second, what is the nature and methodology of  
interpretation?  What are we doing when we interpret phenomena?  What kinds of  explanation are 
provided?  What kinds of  understanding are achieved? 
 
Nietzsche addresses both sets of  questions.  To the first, concerning hermeneutics’ range, his answer 
appears to be: everything.  It is not just texts, works of  art, and so forth that demand interpretation, 
but something like the totality of  human experience.  Nietzsche’s texts are replete with remarks on 
the pervasiveness of  interpretation.  Within a few dozen pages of  Beyond Good and Evil, for example, 
he tells us that physics is “only an interpretation” of  the world (BGE 22); that the Cartesian cogito 
“contains an interpretation of  the process, and does not belong to the process itself ” (BGE 17); that 
philosophical concepts and “world-interpretations” are constrained and channeled by the 
grammatical structure of  the thinker’s language (BGE 20); that modern morality represents “an odd 
narrowness of  interpretation” (BGE 32); that an action’s intention is “merely a sign and a symptom 
that still requires interpretation” (BGE 32); and one could go on and on.1  
 
If  the range of  hermeneutics is the whole of  human experience, hermeneutics’ methods are equally 
broad.  Nietzsche tells us that the philosopher “must have been critic and skeptic and dogmatist and 
historian and also poet and collector and traveler and solver of  riddles and moralist and seer and 
‘free spirit’ and almost everything in order to pass through the whole range of  human values and 
value feelings and to be able to see with many different eyes and consciences, from a height and into 
every distance, from the depths into every height, from a nook into every expanse” (BGE 211).  For, 
if  we seek understanding, we should seek “resolute reversals of  accustomed perspectives and 
valuations… to see differently in this way for once, and to want to see differently, is no small 
discipline and preparation of  the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’… There is only a perspective 
‘knowing’ and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we 
can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of  this thing, our ‘objectivity’, 
                                                            
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse 1886. Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Random House, 1967). Hereafter cited as BGE followed by section number. 
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be” (GM III:12).2  Interpretation, whether of  values or other entities, requires comprehensive 
knowledge, diverse abilities, and the capacity to switch between divergent perspectives. 
 
As these tantalizing remarks indicate, Nietzsche is deeply concerned with the way in which human 
beings interpret phenomena.  But, as I’ll explain below, he also wants to draw attention to the ways 
in which seemingly uninterpreted phenomena, seemingly given experiences, have already been 
interpreted.  And he wants to highlight the ways in which some of  these interpretations have been 
damaging: “Wherever the theologians’ instinct extends, value judgments have been stood on their heads 
and the concepts of  ‘true’ and ‘false’ are of  necessity reversed: whatever is most harmful to life is 
called ‘true’; whatever elevates, enhances, affirms, justifies it, and makes it triumphant is called 
‘false’” (A 9).3  Many of  his works are devoted to this task. 
 
So we have three points: the range of  interpretation is something like the totality of  human 
experience; the methods of  interpretation include capacious knowledge as well as reversals of  
perspective; and interpretive skill is needed because many of  our current interpretations are 
profoundly damaging.  In this essay, I’ll provide a brief  overview of  these matters.  I’ll begin with a 
traditional way of  classifying Nietzsche in relation to hermeneutics: he is often seen as offering a 
hermeneutics of  suspicion.  Finding this characterization potentially misleading, I then provide, in 
the second section, a discussion of  Nietzsche’s interpretive stance.  The third section reviews 
Nietzsche’s philosophical methodology and his objections to more traditional philosophical 
approaches.  Section four discusses Nietzsche’s interpretation of  modernity as a whole as tending 
toward nihilism.  The fifth section offers some brief  reflections on the way in which Nietzsche 
influenced other thinkers in the hermeneutical tradition. 
 
1. A hermeneutics of  suspicion? 
 
When Nietzsche is put in relation to the hermeneutical tradition, he’s often characterized as offering 
a “hermeneutics of suspicion.”  The phrase derives from Paul Ricœur, who famously claimed that 
Nietzsche, along with Marx and Freud, belonged to a “school of suspicion.”  I’ll begin my 
discussion by considering whether and in what sense this label might be helpful. 
 
Ricœur says that what’s distinctive of Nietzsche, along with Freud and Marx, is that "all three clear 
the horizon for a more authentic word, for a new reign of Truth, not only by means of a 'destructive' 
critique, but by the invention of an art of interpreting".4  These thinkers inaugurate a new interpretive 
method that consists in demystifying phenomena and revealing their true meanings.  Thus, 
simplistically, Nietzsche tries to show that what look like attempts to serve God or secure human 
flourishing are really just attempts to express and maintain power.  What makes this a distinctive 
interpretive method, for Ricœur, is the way in which it works back from and undoes falsification: 
“the man of suspicion carries out in reverse the work of falsification of the man of guile” (34).  
Nietzsche, for example, “looks for the key to lying and masks on the side of” those who propound 
                                                            
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral 1887. On the Genealogy of  Morals, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967). Hereafter cited as GM followed 
by Part and Section number. 
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Antichrist 1895. The Antichrist, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Random House, 1967). Hereafter cited as A followed by Section number. 
4 Paul Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy. trans. Denis Savage. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 
33. 
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values (34).  So we first locate the ways in which phenomena have been deliberately obscured; we 
then try to clear away these distortions, working in reverse. 
 
How accurate is this as a characterization of Nietzsche?  In one sense, it’s clearly true that Nietzsche 
adopts a suspicious stance toward phenomena that other philosophers take at face value. Nietzsche 
certainly does reject the stock interpretations of morality, agency, metaphysics, and so on; he 
certainly thinks these are superficial and need to be corrected.5  But being suspicious of past 
philosophical interpretations is hardly distinctive; one of the abiding tropes in philosophy is the 
presentation of oneself as correcting all the failings of previous philosophers.  Moreover, Ricœur’s 
claims about the correction of deliberate falsification are exaggerations: while Nietzsche sometimes 
does present himself as revealing the way in which phenomena have been willfully misdescribed, this 
comprises only a small portion of his writings (e.g., a few sections of the Genealogy and the The 
Antichrist).  In terms of sheer volume, this material is swamped by the writings that aim at correcting 
errors, revealing misconceptions, putting forth new ideals, diagnosing cultural pathologies, and so 
forth.  With a few key exceptions, Nietzsche thinks that falsification and distortion are rarely 
deliberate.   
 
So we need to be more precise about what a hermeneutics of suspicion would be.  Brian Leiter 
articulates a common interpretation of it: he writes that a hermeneutics of suspicion identifies the 
“causal forces that explained the conscious phenomena precisely because they laid bare the true 
meaning of those phenomena: I don’t really want lots of money, I want the love I never go as a child; 
survivors have no moral claim on an inheritance, but it is in the interests of the ruling classes that we 
believe they do, and so on”.6  In other words, the hermeneutics of suspicion is often interpreted as a 
stance which discounts the agent’s conscious understanding of a phenomenon and instead uncovers 
the real and conflicting cause of the that phenomenon.   
 
This, however, is too simplistic.  We can see this already in the clichéd examples that Leiter offers: 
the idea that avowed motives often differ from attributed motives is just a truism, familiar since 
antiquity.  If all that it takes to offer a hermeneutics of suspicion is to reiterate this truism, then every 
theologian who emphasizes the hidden sinfulness of human beings, every philosopher who worries 
about whether purportedly altruistic acts are actually selfish, every economist who distinguishes 
between expressed and revealed preferences, every novelist whose characters are not paragons of 
self-understanding should count.  Clearly Nietzsche is doing more than this. 
 
Now, at one level it’s obvious that Nietzsche is interested in the distinction between the way things 
seem to a subject and the way things seem to a more perceptive, more historically sensitive observer.  
Thus, Ricœur writes that Nietzsche makes “the decision to look upon the whole of consciousness 
primarily as ‘false’ consciousness”.7  Certainly, there is some truth to this: Nietzsche writes, “actions 
are never what they appear to be [. . .] all actions are essentially unknown” (D 116).8  “We are 
necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand 
                                                            
5 For discussion of  these points, see Paul Katsafanas, The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and 
the Unconscious. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
6 Brian Leiter, “The Hermeneutics of  Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud,” in Brian 
Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 74. 
7 Freud and Philosophy, 33. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenröthe, 1881, Section 195.  Daybreak, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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ourselves, for us the law ‘each is furthest from himself ’ applies to all eternity” (GM Preface 1).  So 
Nietzsche does suggest that self-ignorance and perhaps even self-deception are pervasive.  
 
But there are two ways of misinterpreting this. First, we might think, with Leiter and others, that 
Nietzsche is discounting the conscious interpretations and treating the non-conscious meanings as 
the true or real meanings.  But this simply doesn’t fit with his texts, which consistently emphasize the 
importance of conscious misinterpretations:  
 
important as it may be to know the motives from which humanity has acted so far, it might 
be even more essential to know the belief  people had in this or that motive, i.e. what 
humanity has imagined and told itself  to be the real lever or its conduct so far.  For people’s 
inner happiness and misery has come to them depending on their belief  in this or that 
motive—not through the actual motives.  The latter are of  second-order interest.9 (GS 44)  
 
This is just one passage, but it is characteristic of  Nietzsche’s works: the fact that a conscious 
interpretation is distorting, superficial, or falsifying does not entail that it can be ignored, that we 
could understand the agent in isolation from these distortions.  A few sections later, Nietzsche 
writes that  
 
what things are called is unspeakably more important than what they are. The reputation, 
name, and appearance, the worth, the usual weight and measure of a thing—originally 
almost always something mistaken and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress . . . has, 
through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, slowly grown onto and 
into the thing and has become its very body: what started as appearance in the end nearly 
always becomes essence and functions [wirkt] as essence! [. . .] Let us not forget that in the 
long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and presumptions in order to 
create new ‘things’. (GS 58) 
People are interpreting animals, and the interpretations often distort their object.  But these 
distortions are not idle: they influence the nature of the interpreted object.  To conceive of ourselves 
as sinful, for example, doesn’t make it so: but it does alter our relationship to our own activities, the 
emotions that we experience, the cultural institutions that we take part in, the values that we 
embrace, and so on. 
So the first problem with characterizing Nietzsche as offering a hermeneutics of suspicion is that 
this is easily misconstrued as the claim that conscious interpretations should be discounted or 
ignored.  On the contrary, they have immense importance. 
Second, the claim can suggest that Nietzsche is interested in uncovering just any causal forces that 
are operative.  But what he’s especially interested in is the way in which normatively characterized 
phenomenon—moralities, social practices, customs, ideals—are misinterpreted by their bearers.10  
I’ll explain this below. 
                                                            
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft 1882/1887. The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Random House, 1974).  Hereafter cited as GS followed by section number. 
10 True, Nietzsche occasionally gestures at non-normative, physiological explanations of particular 
actions.  But these claims about physiology are most notable for their emptiness: Nietzsche makes 
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2. Nietzsche’s interpretive stance 
 
I’ve suggested that the characterization of  Nietzsche as offering a hermeneutics of  suspicion, while 
accurate if  interpreted in certain ways, is liable to lead to misunderstandings.  In this section, I’ll 
review some general features of  Nietzsche’s interpretive stance.  Along the way, I’ll note that many 
of  these features are shared by other members of  the hermeneutical tradition. 
 
2.1 Rejection of  pre-interpreted phenomena 
 
First, Nietzsche denies that there are any non-interpreted givens from which we can construct 
presuppositionless philosophical or scientific accounts.  He claims that there are no “immediate 
certainties” and mocks the idea that knowledge can get “hold of its object purely and nakedly” 
(BGE  16).  Even our most basic relationship to the world, via sense-perception, is mediated by 
value judgments:  
 
There is no doubt that all sense perceptions are wholly permeated with value-judgments... 
[gänzlich durchsetzt sind mit Wethurtheilen…]11 (KSA 12: 2[95]) 
 
 
He suggests that the world presents itself  as alluring and aversive, as useful and resistant, as 
threatening and charming.  It incorporates evaluative characteristics as a result of  the way in which it 
relates to our activities and interests.  We cannot, he suggests, get past this to some perspective-free 
way of  accessing the world.   
 
And what’s true of  the world in general is true of  the self  in particular: 
 
There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate certainties"; for 
example, "I think," or as the superstition of Schopenhauer put it, "I will"; as though 
knowledge here got hold of its object purely and nakedly as "the thing in itself" without any 
falsification on the part of either the subject or the object. But that "immediate certainty," as 
well as "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a contradictio adjecto. I shall 
repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!  Let 
the people suppose that knowledge means knowing things entirely; the philosopher must say 
to himself: When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, "I think," I find a 
whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove; for 
example, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that 
thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that 
there is an "ego," and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by 
thinking - that I know what thinking is. […]  In place of the "immediate certainty" in which 
the people may believe in the case at hand, the philosopher thus finds a series of 
metaphysical questions presented to him, truly searching questions of the intellect; to wit: 
                                                            
no concrete claims about the connection between particular physiological states and particular 
actions.  
11 Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967-1977).  Hereafter cited as KSA followed by volume, notebook, and 
entry number. 
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"From where do I get the concept of thing? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What 
gives me the right to speak of an ego, and even of an ego as cause, and finally ego as the 
cause of thought?" (BGE 16) 
 
What presents itself  as immediate is, in fact, mediated by conceptual distinctions, metaphysical 
assumptions, and so on. Thus, after reviewing various examples of purportedly given phenomena, 
such as experiences of the will or the I, Nietzsche claims that 
individual philosophical concepts are not anything capricious or autonomously evolving, but 
grow up in connection and relationship with each other; that, however suddenly and 
arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as 
much to a system as all the members of the fauna of a continent. (BGE 20) 
 
In these passages, Nietzsche argues that apparently given phenomena—sensory experiences and 
perceptions of  the fact that I am thinking, for example—have a host of  presuppositions about the 
nature of  agency, thinking, subjectivity, causality, and thinghood.  Were my concept of  agency 
different, Nietzsche emphasizes, I would not perceive my own thinking in the same way.  If  this is 
right, then my current conceptual repertoire influences even the most basic perceptions.   
 
The examples above focus on perceptual concepts and philosophical concepts, but for Nietzsche 
this is a fully general point.  Changes in conceptual repertoires lead to changes in purportedly 




As the passage from BGE 20 suggests, Nietzsche’s rejection of immediate certainties is built upon a 
form of holism.  In fact, he embraces at least two forms of  holism.  He is a holist about meaning; and 
he is a methodological holist about physical and social phenomena.   
 
With regard to meaning, Nietzsche holds that the meanings of  concepts are interdependent.  
Although the above passages focus on specifically philosophical concepts, Nietzsche elsewhere 
generalizes the point.  As he puts it in his notebooks, “An isolated judgment is never ‘true’, never 
knowledge; only in connection and relation of many judgments is there any surety” (KSA 12[7]:4).   
 
Moreover, his approach to studying physical and social phenomena is holistic: as I’ll discuss in the 
following sections, he believes that these phenomena can be grasped and understood only in their 




The holism leads into a related topic: perspectivism. I’ve elsewhere argued that Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is best understood as a development of  Kant’s view.12  According to Kant, the way in 
which we cognize the world depends upon the pure concepts of  the understanding, or categories, 
which specifications of  the our most fundamental concepts and the relations among them.  Kant 
argues that these concepts and relations are uniform for all rational agents (Critique of  Pure Reason 
A80/B106 ff.).  Nietzsche accepts the Kantian claim that concepts structure experience.  However, 
                                                            
12 See The Nietzschean Self, Chapter Three. 
 7 
he rejects the view that there is one set of  concepts and conceptual relations that we necessarily 
impose upon our experience.  Instead, he argues that there are many different, mutually 
incompatible systems of  concepts.  We have no way of  assessing these systems from an external, 
neutral vantage point in order to determine which is best.  Thus, he claims that the “perspective,” or 
set of  relatively fundamental concepts and conceptual relations, differs across historical time; these 
perspectives include classificatory and evaluative concepts; and, while some perspectives can be 
shown to be internally inconsistent, to occlude phenomena that other perspectives reveal, and so on, 
none can be shown to be best.13   
 
Nonetheless, we take these perspectives to present us with immediate, unbiased presentations of  
objects.  We fail to see the way in which the perspectives are local and contingent.  For the 
perspectives are ensconced even in our language: 
 
The word and the concept are the most manifest ground for our belief in this isolation of 
groups of actions: we do not only designate things with them, we think originally that through 
them we grasp the true in things. Through words and concepts we are still continually misled 
into imagining things as being simpler than they are, separate from one another, indivisible, 
each existing in and for itself. A philosophical mythology lies concealed in language which 
breaks out again every moment, however careful one may be otherwise.14  
Our language, our concepts, our distinctions are taken to map onto the structure of  the world; 
whereas, in fact, Nietzsche thinks the world as we experience it is partially constituted by these 
concepts themselves. 
 
Given that our experiences are partially constituted by these perspectives, Nietzsche believes that 
understanding physical and social phenomena requires attention to the perspective of  which they are 
a part.  This is perhaps where he comes closest to the traditional debates within hermeneutics.  
Around the turn of  the nineteenth century, there was sustained debate about whether the human 
sciences required different methodological approaches than the natural sciences.  Some of  the 
philosophers most closely associated with the hermeneutical tradition, including Dilthey, advocated a 
distinct, hermeneutical approach to the human sciences.  Put simply, these thinkers argued that the 
human sciences were distinctive in that they concerned meanings that would be lost or occluded by a 
natural scientific approach.  Nietzsche isn’t directly engaged with this debate.  He sees the natural 
sciences as continuous with the human sciences.  But this is not for the familiar reason—it is not 
because the human sciences needn’t concern themselves with meanings.  Rather, it’s because he sees 
the natural sciences, too, as concerned with meanings.  So, while thinkers like Helmholtz argue that 
human sciences deal with value whereas natural sciences deal only with “dead, indifferent matter”, 
Nietzsche sees the natural sciences as tacitly concerned with value as well: not in the sense that 
values are the explicit object of  concern, but in the sense that the allegedly value-free distinctions 
                                                            
13 Nietzsche’s talk of  perspectives sometimes focuses on these kinds of  conceptual changes, and 
sometimes on affective changes.  Thus, he will point out that an individual’s “perspective” can shift 
when the individual begins to experience different affects.  As these points are less relevant for our 
purposes, I here focus solely on the points about concepts.   
14 Menschliches, Allzumenschliches.  Human, All too Human, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), Volume II, Part 2, Section 11. 
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and concepts with which (say) the physicist operates presuppose and reinforce evaluative views.15  
Thus, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes that  
 
It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that physics, too, is only a world-
interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, if I may say so!) and not a world-




‘Nature's conformity to law’, of which you physicists talk so proudly, as though--why, it 
exists only owing to your interpretation and bad ‘philology.’ It is no matter of fact, no ‘text’, 
but rather just a naively humanitarian adjustment and perversion of meaning, with which you 
make abundant concessions to the democratic instincts of the modern soul! ‘Everywhere 
equality before the law--Nature is not different in that respect, nor better than we’: a fine 
instance of secret motive, in which the vulgar antagonism to everything privileged and 
autocratic--likewise a second and more refined atheism--is once more disguised. (BGE 22) 
 
Analogously, in the Gay Science, Nietzsche criticizes the “faith with which so many materialistic 
natural scientists rest content nowadays, the faith in a world that is supposed to have its equivalent 
and its measure in human thought and human valuations… That the only rightful interpretation of  
the world should be… one that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, grasping, and 
nothing else…”  (GS 373) 
 
Regardless of  whether Nietzsche’s claims about physics are defensible, they do illustrate his general 
point: there is no set of  concepts or distinctions that is wholly free of  evaluative implications and 
assumptions. 
 
2.4 Concepts and language   
Nietzsche extends these reflections on concepts and language to an analysis of conscious thought. 
He maintains that conscious thought is itself  dependent on concepts: 
Man, like every living being, thinks continually without knowing it [denkt immerfort, aber weiss es 
nicht]; the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this—the most 
superficial and worst part—for only this conscious thinking occurs in words, which is to say signs 
of communication [denn allein dieses bewußte Denken geschieht in Worten, das heisst in 
Mittheilungszeichen], and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness. In brief, the 
development of language and the development of consciousness (not of Reason but merely 
of the way Reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand. (GS 354)  
Here, Nietzsche claims that conscious thinking is linguistically articulated.  Elsewhere, I’ve argued 
that he means, by this, that conscious thinking is conceptually articulated.16  But, for the reasons 
                                                            
15 Hermann von Helmholtz, “On the Relation of Natural Science to Science in General,” in Science 
and Culture: Popular and Philosophical Essays, ed. David Cahan. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995: 76-95), 81.  
 
16 See The Nietzschean Self, Chapters 2-3. 
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discussed in the previous section, the meanings of  concepts are not transparent to agents.  We fail to 
recognize the way in which our thoughts are channeled by linguistic structures and concepts.  
Accordingly, Nietzsche takes conscious (that is, linguistic/conceptual) experience to falsify and 
distort non-conscious thought. Different conceptual schemes would reveal different aspects of non-
conscious thought; none would present it as it is pre-conceptually.  Thus, “the world of which we 
can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a world generalized and made common 
[eine Oberflächen- und Zeichenwelt, eine verallgemeinerte, eine vergemeinerte Welt]” (GS 354). Consciousness is a 
“simplifying apparatus” (KSA 11: 34[46]), which “involves a vast and thorough corruption, 
falsification, superficialization, and generalization” (GS 354). 
 
 
3.  Nietzsche’s methodology 
3.1 Genealogical investigation of perspectives  
The picture that emerges from Nietzsche’s writings is one in which we must give up the idea that 
there are any simply given phenomena; concepts, propositions, and indeed even our experiences have 
meaning only in relation to the perspectives of  which they are a part.  How, then, are these 
phenomena to be understood?  Nietzsche’s answer is well-known: we must engage in genealogy. 
 
Nietzsche attributes the general point to Hegel.  He says that Hegel is one of  only three Germans 
who made substantial philosophical contributions.17  Specifically, he notes “Hegel’s astonishing 
move, with which he struck through all logical habits and indulgences when he dared to teach that 
species concepts develop out of  each other…” (GS 357).  In other words, Hegel saw that concepts are 
not fixed and immutable, but are things with histories; he saw that grasping the meaning of  a 
concept required situating it in its own conceptual scheme.  
 
But there is a crucial difference between Nietzsche and Hegel. Hegel has a vindicatory story 
according to which, in broad outlines, inadequate conceptual schemes are sublated by progressively 
more adequate ones.  Although there are controversies about how to read the transitions between 
conceptual schemes that Hegel discusses in the Phenomenology and elsewhere, one reading is that the 
progression is rational: the felt inadequacy of  a given conceptual scheme motivates the introduction 
of  a new conceptual scheme, which resolves the tensions or contradictions in the former scheme.  
Whether this is the best way of  reading Hegel doesn’t matter; what does matter is that Nietzsche 
rejects it.  For Nietzsche sees shifts between conceptual schemes as mostly arational.  We shouldn’t 
expect rational progressions in conceptual transitions: we shouldn’t expect supplanting perspectives 
to resolve tensions in the supplanted perspectives.  In the Genealogy, for example, Nietzsche 
investigates the transition between an ancient warrior morality and Judeo-Christian morality.  Rather 
than tracing the transition to conceptual inadequacies in the former, he believes a host of  social and 
psychological factors ranging from the desire for political power, the desire for vindicatory self-
conceptions, fantasies of  revenge on an oppressive ruling class, and self-deception about the nature 
of  agency explain the transition.  These factors are highly contingent and likely unrepeatable: there is 
no expectation that societies with similar structures would undergo analogous transformations.  In 
that sense, the explanation is quite local.  Moreover, the supplanting moral scheme does not resolve 
                                                            
17 Kant is credited with a second insight, specifically the one mentioned above about concepts 
structuring experience.  The third is Leibniz, whom Nietzsche credits with the discovery of  the 
unconscious. 
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tensions within the former scheme; on the contrary, Nietzsche is at pains to present the later moral 
scheme as even more conflict-ridden, distorting, and inadequate than the former.   
 
Genealogy thus reveals that transitions between conceptual schemes and the persistence of  these 
schemes is explained by arational social and psychological processes.  But genealogy also helps us to 
grasp the phenomena in which we are interested. Take morality: absent genealogy, we might 
erroneously assume that morality is a unified phenomenon, with parts that cohere, with a unified 
goal, a unified meaning.  Nietzsche instead presents it as an amalgam of  disparate parts, welded 
together only by historical accident. Nietzsche makes the same point about social phenomena in 
general: he thinks that understanding any particular social phenomenon (punishment, judgments of  
responsibility, moral codes, political ideals, etc.) require situating that phenomenon in its historical 
context.  Consider his famous remarks on punishment: he writes that while the “custom,” “act,” and 
“drama” of  punishment is relatively constant across societies, “the meaning, the purposes, the 
expectation associated with the performance of  such procedures” is “fluid” (GM II: 13).  The 
mechanisms of  punishment (constraint, infliction of  suffering, etc.) are relatively constant; but the 
meaning is not.  For 
 
the concept “punishment” possesses in fact not one meaning but a whole synthesis of  
“meanings”: the previous history of  punishment in general, the history of  its employment 
for the most various purposes, finally crystallizes into a kind of  unity that is hard to 
disentangle, hard to analyze and, as must be emphasized especially, totally indefinable. (Today 
it is impossible to say for certain why people are really punished: all concepts in which an 
entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has no history is 
definable.) (GM II: 13) 
 
The same point applies to other social practices.  When we examine what initially looks like a 
unified, stable phenomenon, we find discontinuities, amalgamations of  loosely related purposes, and 
the grafting of  disconnected practices onto one another.  Thus, Nietzsche writes that one of  the 
dangerous errors of  philosophers is  
 
their lack of an historical sense, their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their Egypticism. 
They think that they show their respect for a thing when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeterni 
— when they turn it into a mummy.  All that philosophers have handled for thousands of 
years have been concept-mummies; nothing real escaped their grasp alive. Whenever these 
venerable concept-idolaters revere something, they kill it and stuff it; they threaten the life of 
everything they worship.” (TI III: 1)18 
 
This is one reason why a genealogical approach is needed.  Genealogy traces the contingent 
historical connections between phenomena, showing how they emerged, were transformed, and 
persisted. 
 
3.2 Assessing perspectives  
                                                            
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, 1889.  Twilight of  the Idols, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in The 
Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1968).  Hereafter cited as TI followed by part and section 
number. 
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Assume that we conduct a detailed historical and genealogical investigation of  a perspective, getting 
it clearly into view.  What next?  Nietzsche suggests that the articulation of  the perspective 
sometimes enables us to critique it.  In fact, he presents his as his real aim: “my real concern was 
something much more important than hypothesis-mongering, either my own or other people’s, on 
the origin of  morality…what was at stake was the value of  morality” (GM Preface 5).  So genealogy 
somehow enables critique.  But how, exactly? 
 
Although there are different interpretive options, I think the most defensible reading is a roughly 
Hegelian one: Nietzsche appeals solely to immanent critique.  On this interpretation, we have to show 
that a perspective is defective in terms of  standards that the inhabitants of  the perspective would 
themselves accept. Perspective A is better than perspective B if  you can show an inhabitant of  
perspective B that she has reason to switch to perspective A. 
 
This criterion is often interpreted solely in epistemic terms.  On this reading, the transition from A 
to B involves some kind of  epistemic gain: it resolves a contradiction to which B succumbs, or 
explains a phenomenon that A occludes, or resolves a tension within A, and so on.  So, for example, 
The Genealogy argues that Judeo-Christian morality has inconsistent values, incoherent conceptions of  
agency and responsibility, and so on.  We can recognize this from within the Judeo-Christian 
perspective; and we can thus see that we have reason to modify or abandon it. 
 
But what about situations in which we’re faced with two incommensurable perspectives, each with 
its own flaws, with neither one resolving the tensions with the other?  This is, more or less, the 
scenario Nietzsche presents us with in the Genealogy.  True, Judeo-Christian morality is presented as 
leading to pathology, self-deception, and a hindrance of  human flourishing; but the archaic warrior 
morality looks oppressive, superficial, and damning for the bulk of  humanity.  Epistemic criteria 
won’t provide good grounds for shifting from one to the other; both contain internal tensions and 
contradictions.   
 
Crucially, Nietzsche also appeals to evaluative criteria in assessing perspectives.  Roughly, he tries to 
show that certain perspectives should be rejected because they undermine or conflict with “will to 
power”.  He often expresses this point by claiming that a given perspective is counter to life or health; 
but those notions are defined in terms of will to power.  Thus, he writes that modern morality is 
“hostile to life” and “negates life”19, that it undermines “the highest power and splendor actually 
possible to the type man” (GM Preface 6), and so on.  How should these remarks be taken?  As I 
interpret him, Nietzsche argues for a conception of agency according to which each action aims at 
power; given this, moral interpretations which occlude this connection, or which lead us astray from 
our aims, are to be rejected.  Thus, these critiques in terms of power are still immanent critique, 
because the standard of will to power is (purportedly) present in every perspective.20   
 
So we can critique perspectives on immanent grounds, and these grounds can be both epistemic and 
evaluative.  This will enable us to show that certain perspectives are preferable to others.  However, 
Nietzsche doesn’t think that this will give us a unique final perspective.  He thinks there will be 
                                                            
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche Contra Wagner (1895).  Nietzsche Contra Wagner, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche. (New York: Viking, 1968). 
20 Paul Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of  Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), Chapter Six. 
 12 
different, mutually incompatible perspectives that are equally well justified.  Or, put differently: there 
are better and worse perspectives, but we have no reason to believe that there is any best perspective. 
Notice, too, that this critique is always historically situated. We don't generate and assess perspectives 
ex nihilo.  We start with our own perspective, and move on (or not) from there. 
 
3.3 Does Nietzsche have a specific hermeneutical theory?   
Given all of  this, Nietzsche rejects the idea that there are unitary, neatly distinguishable natural, 
social, and evaluative phenomena: what looks unified from one perspective won’t from another.  But 
does Nietzsche advocate any specific method for studying these phenomena?  Does he, as Ricœur 
and others suggest, endorse some explicit hermeneutical strategy? 
 
As I read him, he doesn’t.  Nietzsche rejects ahistorical approaches to these phenomena.  Aside 
from that, though, he does not offer any specific set of procedures that one must follow.  He’s 
always open to revision: he treats his own hypotheses as provisional. Thus, after offering a genealogy 
of the transition from Homeric morality to Judeo-Christian morality, he appends a note suggesting 
that someone organize a “series of academic prize essays” on the history of morality, open to 
philologists, historians, professional philosophers, doctors, and physiologists (GM I:17).  The 
suggestion seems to be that these studies could supplant his own.  
We can make a few additional generalizations, though.  For one thing, Nietzsche is interested in 
normatively characterized phenomena.  Although this is probably obvious to most readers, 
Nietzsche is concerned with practices in which agents adopt norms, principles, values; in which they 
adopt normatively laden concepts such as obedience and guilt; and in which their own perspectives 
on these phenomena make a different in determining what these phenomena are.   
 
Additionally, Nietzsche doesn’t suggest that interpretation of  these phenomena requires identifying 
some best interpretation and showing that and why it is superior to erroneous interpretations.  
Rather, he tries to offer better explanations.  He tries to show that interpretation A is better than 
interpretation B in that A reveals things that B conceals, or accounts for factors that B overlooks, or 
makes sense of  contradictions and tensions in B, of  reveals otherwise hidden connections, or makes 
better sense of  the agents’ motivations, etc.  So, the person who understands some area, who has 
knowledge of  it, is best understood as the person who has a systematic understanding of  a series of  
related facts, who sees how these facts connect; often the connections won’t be logical entailments, 
and often seeing the connections will require both historical sensitivity and interpretive skill. 
 
 
4. Interpreting history, interpreting modernity  
With these remarks on interpretation, language, and thought at hand, we can examine one of  the 




Nietzsche treats human beings as fundamentally driven by a desire for interpretations of  their 
experience that render experience meaningful.  Consider Nietzsche’s first book, the Birth of  Tragedy.21  
There, he writes that “the Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of  existence” (BT 3); in 
particular, the Greek recognizes that “despite all its beauty and moderation, his entire existence 
rested on a hidden substratum of  suffering” (BT 4).  The Olympian gods were designed to address 
this need: “that he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between himself  and life the 
radiant dream-birth of  the Olympians” (BT 3).  The Olympian gods are intended for “seducing one 
to a continuation of  life” (BT 3).     
 
Analogous points are made in the Gay Science.  In a section entitled “The teachers of  the purpose of  
existence,” Nietzsche writes: 
 
At present, we still live in the age of  tragedy, in the age of  moralities and religions. What is 
the meaning of  the ever-new appearance of  these founders of  moralities and religions, of  
these instigators of  fights about moral valuations, these teachers of  pangs of  conscience and 
religious wars? … It is obvious that these tragedies, too, work in the interest of  the species, 
even if  they should believe that they are working in the interest of  God, as God’s emissaries. 
They, too, promote the life of  the species by promoting the faith in life. ‘Life is worth living’, 
each of  them shouts, ‘there is something to life, there is something behind life, beneath it; 
beware!’ … Life ought to be loved because--! … The ethical teacher makes his appearance as the 
teacher of  the purpose of  existence in order that what happens necessarily and always, by 
itself  and without a purpose, shall henceforth seem to be done for a purpose and strike man 
as reason and an ultimate commandment… (GS 1) 
 
Here, Nietzsche claims that the essential feature of  religions and moralities is that they provide an 
explanation or meaning for otherwise meaningless events.  In its most general form, this is the belief  
that life has some meaning or purpose.  In more particular contexts, it’s the belief  that certain 
actions or pursuits are worthy and others worthless.   
 
Analogously, at the end of  the Genealogy, he writes:  
[Man] did not know how to justify, explain, affirm himself: he suffered from the problem of his 
meaning. He suffered otherwise as well, he was for the most part a diseased animal; but the 
suffering itself was not his problem, rather that the answer was missing to the scream of his 
question: ‘to what end suffering?’ Man, the bravest of animals and the one most accustomed to 
suffering, does not negate suffering, he wants it, he even seeks it out, provided one shows 
him a meaning for it, a to-this-end of suffering. The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, 
was the curse thus far stretched over humanity. (GM III: 28)  
In these passages, Nietzsche again emphasizes the profound desire that we have to interpret our 
existence in a way that renders it meaningful.  He interprets particular moral systems, from the 
morality of  the ancient Greeks, to that of  the early Christians, to that of  modernity, as responsive to 
this need. 
                                                            
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872).  The Birth of Tragedy, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: Modern Library, 1967).  Hereafter 




He worries, though, that we are on the cusp of  a crisis.  The systems that formerly answered this 
need are becoming unsustainable.  Briefly, his point is that we have come to value truth for its own 
sake, as opposed to merely for the sake of  other ends; when this commitment to truth becomes 
sufficiently strong, Nietzsche claims that it will undermine the purported grounds for our traditional 
values (see GM III).  He tells us that “the whole of  our European morality” is on the verge of  
“collapse” (GS 343), for “the deeper one looks, the more our valuations disappear—meaninglessness 
approaches!” (KSA 11:25[505]).   For truthful inquiry reveals that these moral systems have been 
supported on extraordinarily thin grounds.  
 
Suppose this is right.  Nietzsche worries that with the collapse of  ideals, we will enter a phase of  
nihilism.  Although Nietzsche discusses several different types of  nihilism, the one that is relevant 
here is anomie: social pressures, convention, emotional attachments, and so forth may keep us 
attached to certain values for a time, but these values lack any coherent justification.  As a result, our 
commitments are at risk of  becoming attenuated: we may cease to treat these values as overriding 
and authoritative.  We see them as optional, as capable of  being abandoned.  Custom, habit, and 
inertia might preserve vestigial forms of  these values, but the sense of  their importance, the sense 
that they override competing pressures, will dissipate.     
 
When this occurs, the desire for interpretations that render existence meaningful or affirmable goes 
unmet.  Thus, Nietzsche endeavors to give some new interpretation: he considers efforts to curtail 
or circumscribe the will to truth, efforts to enact an aesthetic justification of  existence, efforts to 
affirm the eternal recurrence of  one’s life, and struggles to inaugurate new ideals (GS Preface 4, GS 
107, BGE 59, GM III).  I lack the space to explore the details here, but the common thread is readily 
apparent: Nietzsche wants to find a way of  preserving these meaning-conferring interpretations in 
historical and social circumstances that render them dubious.   
 
5. Nietzsche’s influence 
In closing, a very brief  word on the powerful and pervasive influence of  Nietzsche’s thought.  
Georg Simmel describes Nietzsche as the Copernicus of  philosophical ethics, effecting a 
transformation in philosophy as profound as that of  Copernicus on astronomy.22  The list of  
thinkers influenced by him encompasses nearly all of  the notable German and French philosophers 
of  the twentieth century, including many who play active roles in the hermeneutical tradition: 
Adorno, Camus, Deleuze, Foucault, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Jaspers, Sartre, Scheler, Weber, and the 
list could go on.  Many of  these thinkers are covered by other essays in this volume, so let me close 
by mentioning just one: Michel Foucault, who is especially close to Nietzsche.  
 
Foucault’s methodological approach is in many respects Nietzschean: like Nietzsche, Foucault 
devotes many of  his works to revealing the historically contingent and fluid nature of  concepts, 
social institutions, and values that have traditionally been taken as necessary and fixed.  Like 
Nietzsche, Foucault tries to reveal the way in which purportedly universal truths about human beings 
and human nature are, when examined carefully, contingent expressions of  the evaluative beliefs of  
particular cultures.  Like Nietzsche, Foucault’s critical analyses of  present conditions often reveal the 
way in which these present conditions are damaging or oppressive.  And, like Nietzsche, Foucault 
                                                            
22 Georg Simmel, Friedrich Nietzsche – Eine moralphilosophische Silhouette, in H. Dahme and D. Frisby 
(eds.), Aufsätze und Abhandlungen, 1894 bis 1900. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 124. 
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believes that these damaging effects often require careful study: they are not obvious at first glance; 
uncovering them requires attentive, prolonged investigation of  social institutions and practices.  
 
But there are differences. One that stands out right away, when comparing the two thinkers, is the 
level of  historical detail and erudition in Foucault’s studies.  Nietzsche’s historical texts—The Birth of  
Tragedy, The Genealogy, The Antichrist—are brilliant but, with a few exceptions, are largely unmoored 
from concrete, detailed historical evidence.  The evidence may be there in the background—
Foucault may be right that genealogy “depends on a vast accumulation of  source material”—but, if  
Nietzsche has this evidence, he certainly doesn’t present it.23  So, whereas Nietzsche spends a few 
pages on the changing forms and meanings of  punishment (Genealogy of  Morals: II), Foucault 
provides over three hundred pages, replete with detailed evidence, on the emergence of  the modern 
penal system.24  
 
In addition, Foucault’s distinction between archeology and genealogy involves something of  a 
departure from Nietzsche.  In most of  his texts, Foucault advocates an “archaeological” approach.25  
He maintains that philosophical and scientific systems, as well as knowledge claims in general, are 
governed by principles that operate non-consciously.  Thus, studying what individuals consciously 
think will give us only part of  the picture; we also need to examine the unconscious structures 
within which these conscious thoughts arise.  Archaeology attempts to uncover these structures, 
revealing the way in which they constrain thought within particular perspectives (or “epistemes,” as 
Foucault calls them).  Whereas archaeology reveals these principles, in late works Foucault presents 
genealogy as playing a more critical role: it shows the effects of  these contingent principles on the 
present, and thereby seeks to undermine or destabilize them.26  
 
6. Concluding remarks  
This essay has outlined the ways in which Nietzsche’s concerns intersect with those of  the 
hermeneutical tradition.  I began by arguing that while characterizing Nietzsche as offering a 
hermeneutics of  suspicion is not wrong, it is easily misinterpreted. More concretely, I’ve argued that 
Nietzsche's interpretive stance has several key features: he rejects immediate givens, endorses holism 
and perspectivism, and sees conscious experience as structured by concepts and language.  
Methodologically, Nietzsche inaugurates a genealogical approach to studying objects of  
philosophical concern, and offers a series of  thoughts and arguments on perspectives and the ways 
in which they might be assessed.  I reviewed the way in which he takes religious, moral, and 
philosophical systems as aspiring to provide an interpretation of  existence that renders it 
meaningful, while seeing this demand as unmet by modernity.  In closing, I offered some brief  
reflections on Foucault’s Nietzschean approach to interpretation. 
  
                                                            
23 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader 
(London: Penguin, 1984). 
24 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir, Paris: Gallimard, 1975 (Discipline and Punish, translated by Alan 
Sheridan, New York: Pantheon, 1977). 
25 Michel Foucault, L'archéologie du savoir, Paris: Gallimard, 1969 (The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
translated by Allan Sheridan, New York: Harper and Row, 1972). 
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